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BHAN u. NME HOSPITALS, INC.: WHEN A NURSE 
IS MORE THAN A NURSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Bhan u. NME Hospitals, Inc., l the Ninth Circuit over-
turned a district court decision which held that, as a matter of 
law, a nurse anesthesist did not compete in the same market as 
an M.D. anesthesiologist.2 The Ninth Circuit ruled that a nurse 
anesthesist was a proper party to bring an antitrust action chal-
lenging defendant's new policy of allowing only M.D. anesthesi-
ologists to work in Manteca Hospital. S The district court's dis-
missal of the plaintiff's suit under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6)4 was reversed and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings. II 
As a registered nurse anesthesist,6 plaintiff Vinod C. Bhan 
1. 772 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Merrill, J.; the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J. and Williams, D.J., Senior United States District Judge, Central District of 
California, sitting by designation). 
2. [d. at 1471. 
3. [d. 
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a defensive motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's pleading because of its "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
5. 772 F.2d at 1471. 
6. California Business and Professions Code, section 2826(a) defines a nurse anes-
thesist as "a person who is a registered nurse, licensed by the board and who has met 
standards for certification from the board." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2826(a) (West 
Supp. 1986). The "board" refers to the Division of Allied Health Professions of the 
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had engaged in the bulk of his practice at Manteca Hospital 
under the hospital's contract with Associated Anesthesia Ser-
vices. But when that contract expired on March 31, 1983, the 
hospital established a new policy allowing only M.D. anesthesiol-
ogists to practice in its operating rooms.7 As a result, Bhan was 
effectively prevented from practicing at Manteca Hospital and 
most of his practice was destroyed.8 
Plaintiff sued under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman ActS 
claiming that the new policy constituted a combination in re-
straint of trade. lo The district court granted defendant's motion 
7. 772 F. 2d at 1468. The new policy was arrived at by the hospital board on the 
recommendation of defendant Menaugh (the hospital administrator), and defendant 
Yong Suk, M.D., as an inducement to Suk to relocate from Michigan to Manteca. Plain-
tiff Bhan alleged that the new policy was motivated by the fact that because nurse anes-
thesists' services are often more attractive to consumers due to their lower cost and their 
more flexible scheduling, an exclusive contract would be necessary to make it financially 
worthwhile for Suk to relocate. [d. at 1469. 
8. [d. at 1469. 
9. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. 
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony .... 
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985). 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... " Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1985). 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act states: "Any person who shall be injured in his business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor 
.... " Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (1985). 
10. 765 F.2d at 1469. In Blue Shield of Virginia u. McCready, the Court stated that 
the broad language of section 4, coupled with the lack of words of restriction, reflected 
an intent by Congress to give the statute an expansive remedial purpose. This expansive 
reading would effectively create a private enforcement mechanism, deter violators, and 
provide ample compensation to victims. 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). 
In McCready, defendants entered into an arrangement whereby Blue Shield would 
reimburse its subscribers for treatment by psychiatrists but not for the services of psy-
chologists unless the treatment was supervised by and billed through a physician. [d. at 
468. The Court stated: 
Although McCready was not a competitor of the conspira-
tors, the injury she suffered was inextricably intertwined with 
the injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists 
and the psychology market .... [W)e think that McCready's 
injury flows from that which makes the defendant's act unlaw-
ful . . . and falls squarely within the area of Congressional 
concern. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/6
1986] ANTITRUST LAW 13 
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It 
reasoned that even if the hospital's new policy constituted an 
illegal combination in restraint of trade, the plaintiff was not a 
proper party to bring the antitrust action against the defendants 
because California law precluded nurse anesthesists from com-
peting in the same market as M.D. anesthel3iologists.l1 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Associated General Contractors of California v. Califor-
nia State Council of Carpenters,12 the United States Supreme 
Court stated that because of the infinite variety of claims that 
could arise, a universally applicable black-letter rule could not 
be announced as to when an antitrust suit could be brought. 13 
Instead, a case by case determination would be required, using a 
variety of factors.14 The only one of these factors at issue in 
Bhan was the requirement that the alleged injury be the type of 
injury that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. lG This 
requirement is twofold. First, there must be a sufficient physical 
and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the harm 
to plaintiff.18 Second, the plaintiff must participate in the same 
relevant market as the defendants.17 
Id. at 483-84. 
But the McCready Court also set limits on who may be a proper party to sue under 
the antitrust laws. It found that not every party who has suffered an injury in fact is 
entitled to recover. Certain injuries due to antitrust violations are too remote and there 
is a point beyond which liability should not extend. Id. at 477. 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court further narrowed and de-
lineated this scope when it stated that the antitrust laws were enacted for "the protec-
tion of competition, not competitors." 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
11. 765 F.2d at 1469. The legislature defined the practice of nursing to include the 
administration of medications and therapeutic agents but it also mandated that this 
must be ordered by and administered under the direction of a physician. CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 2725(b) (West Supp. 1986). 
12. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
13. Id. at 535-36. 
14. Id. at 536-37. The factors identified by the Court included the nature of the 
alleged injury, whether the plaintiff is a consumer or a competitor in the relevant mar-
ket, the causal relationship between the alleged injury and the alleged restraint, the po-
tential for duplicative recovery, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged 
conspiracy. Id. at 537-45. 
15. 772 F.2d at 1470. 
16. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982). 
17. Id. at 478. In considering the relevant market, the Bhan court focused on 
whether there was a "reasonable interchangeability of use" or "cross-elasticity of de-
mand" between the services offered by the plaintiff and those offered by the defendant. 
3
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Using the test enunciated in Associated General Contrac-
tors, the Ninth Circuit found Bhan had demonstrated a suffi-
cient nexus between the alleged violation and his economic 
harm. The hospital's new policy had resulted in the loss of 
eighty-percent of his practice. This loss was not fortuitous, re-
mote, or incidental to the alleged violations, but flowed directly 
from the new policy banning the use of nurse anesthesists in the 
hospital.18 
The key factor thus became whether anesthesists and anes-
thesiologists competed in the same market. Ie The court noted 
that the legislature had placed legal restrictions on nurse anes-
thesists which require any medications administered by a nurse 
to be ordered by and given under the direction of a physician.20 
But rather than ending its inquiry here, as the district court had 
done, the Ninth Circuit determined that a nurse anesthesist can 
still perform many of the functions of an M.D. anesthesiolo-
gist.21 Thus, the issue came down to whether the need for an 
additional input, due to the supervision requirement, prevented 
the two "products" from being interchangeable. The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that it did not, as a matter of law, and that 
Bhan's allegations were sufficient to establish that he was a 
proper party to bring the action.211 
To reach this conclusion, the court drew an analogy between 
the instant case and the situations in Telex Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp.28 and Calnetics Corp. v. Volk-
swagen of America, Inc. 1I4 In those cases the courts held that two 
products could be considered part of the same relevant market, 
even if one of the products required an additional input to make 
I 
it interchangeable with the other, as long as production could 
772 F.2d at 1470-71. This is determined by practical factors such 88 industry or public 
recognition of the submarket 88 a separate entity, unique customers, specialized vendors, 
and distinct characteristics and use of the product. Where there is a high degree of "sub-
stitutability" in the use of two services, then the market for the two should be consid-
ered the same. See Twin City Sportserv v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1272-
74 (9th Cir. 1975). 
18. 772 F.2d at 1469. 
19. Id. at 1470. 
20. 772 F.2d at 1471 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2725(b) (West Supp. 1986)). 
21. 772 F.2d at 1471. 
22.Id. 
23. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). 
24. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). 
, 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/6
1986] ANTITRUST LAW 15 
easily be converted from one to the other.211 The court in Bhan 
reasoned that because the physician required by statute to su-
pervise an anesthesist can be any physician, not just an M.D. 
anesthesiologist, and because such supervision is both common 
and readily obtainable in the medical profession, there did exist 
a reasonable interchangeability between the services of an anes-
thesist and those of an M.D. anesthesiologist.26 
III. CONCLUSION 
In Bhan, the Ninth Circuit has further clarified which par-
ties are proper to bring an antitrust action. In addition, as evi-
denced by the amicus briefs filed on behalf of the plaintiff by 
the Attorney General of California, and by the Federal Trade 
Commission,27 Bhan may become an important consumer pro-
tection decision if, upon remand, the district court finds for the 
plaintiff. The case may serve both to promote the state's recog-
nition of nursing as a dynamic growing profession and help con-
tain a small part of the spiraling costs of medical care by provid-
ing consumers with a choice of anesthesia services. 
Jeffrey L. Henze· 
25. See Telex Corp., 510 F.2d 915-19; Calnetics Corp., 532 F.2d 691. In these cases, 
the courts held that one manufacturer did have standing to sue another for antitrust 
violations, even if the products the companies produced were not identical, as long as 
one company's production facilities could easily have been turned to the production of 
the other company's products. If this could readily be done, the degree of substitutability 
would still be found to be high and the products would be considered part of the same 
relevant market. 
26. 772 F.2d at 1471. 
27. Id. at 1468. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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